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sufficient interest in him to have the power of adjudicating his marital
status. Such a move would eliminate much of the sham now surrounding
ex parte divorces and would allow the courts to resolve equitably any con-
flicts in traditional legal terms.
W. T. Minick
Mental Suffering - Texas Stands Firm - No "New" Tort
Plaintiff Fisher entered the dining club of the defendant Carrousel Mo-
tor Hotel for a luncheon engagement. As he entered the serving line and
picked up his plate, defendant's manager approached Fisher and snatched
the plate from his hands. The manager informed Fisher in a loud and of-
fensive manner that Fisher could not be served in the club because he was
a Negro. Fisher brought an action for assault,' seeking special damages for
the great humiliation and indignity' allegedly suffered as a result of the
manager's conduct. The court of civil appeals, affirming the trial court,
held that as a matter of law no assault had been committed and that absent
a physical touching, assault, or resulting physical injury, Fisher could not
recover for embarrassment or humiliation.' Held, reversed and rendered:
Snatching an article from the hands of another is sufficient invasion of the
inviolability of the person to constitute a battery4 and entitles the plaintiff
to compensation' for the mental disturbance inflicted upon him as a result
of such invasion. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627
(Tex. 1967).
' Fisher brought an action for assault in the trial court and appealed on the theory that the
trial court was in error for not finding as a matter of law that an assault had been committed.
The supreme court found no assault, but held that a battery had been committed.
'Fisher testified that he suffered no fear or apprehension.
3Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 414 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
'A battery is the use of any unlawful violence on the person of another with the intent to
injure him, whatever the means or degree of violence used. The action of battery protects the rights
of each individual to be free of intentional and unpermitted physical contact, and the element of
personal dignity involved allows compensation for trivial contacts which do no physical harm but
are offensive or insulting. Knocking or snatching anything from the plaintiff's hand or touching
anything connected with his person when done in a rude or insolent manner is sufficient to con-
stitute a battery. To be a battery, the touching must be offensive to an ordinary person and not
one unduly sensitive about his personal dignity. The normal person is said to consent to the usual
and common touchings encountered in everyday activities. See Schmitt v. Kurrus, 234 Ill. 578, 85
N.E. 261 (1908); Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 1 So. 2d 510 (1941); Tsx. PEN. CODE
ANN. art. 1138 (1953); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 9 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §5 18, 19 (1964).
If a battery has been committed and defendant can show no defense or privilege, plaintiff
is at least entitled to nominal damages for the infraction of a legal right. Compensatory damages
can be recovered for any injury directly flowing from the battery on the plaintiff. Exemplary or
punitive damages are allowed for a battery committed wantonly, maliciously, or under circum-
stances of aggravation and are awarded to punish defendant for his wrongful act and to deter
others from committing the same type of unpermitted invasion of plaintiff's right. See Miller v.
Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948); McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal. App. 2d 249,
171 P.2d 85 (1946); Kast v. Link, 90 Neb. 25, 132 N.W. 717 (1911); Walker v. L.B. Price
Mercantile Co., 203 N.C. 511, 166 S.E. 391 (1932); Texas Coal & Fuel Co. v. Arenstein, 55
S.W. 127 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900). See generally C. McCoRMIcsc, DAMAGES § 81 (1935).
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I. RECOVERY FOR MENTAL SUFFERING
An Element of Damages. The courts have been very cautious in allowing
recovery of damages compensating mental suffering. Originally, the con-
sequences of mental disturbance were considered too intangible and pe-
culiar for the court to ascertain or measure.6 Some early courts, noting that
that the plaintiff alone could testify as to the severity of the mental suffer-
ing, felt that numerous fraudulent claims would result if recovery for in-
fliction of mental distress' was permitted.8 In addition, early courts believed
that an attempt to provide protection for peace of mind would swamp the
dockets with an enormous amount of cases.9
The first breakthrough in allowing damages for mental suffering
came within the framework of traditional tort law. If the plaintiff estab-
lished the existence of a recognized tort from which mental suffering nat-
urally flowed, he could recover for any mental suffering incident to the
commission of such a tort." Thus, in an action for false imprisonment, re-
covery for "injury to feelings" and "anxiety of mind" was allowed, and in
an action for seduction, "injured feelings" were compensable. The close re-
lationship between the tort and the resulting mental suffering assured the
courts that they were not awarding plaintiffs damages for fraudulent
claims. 2 Gradually, this close relationship was de-emphasized, and com-
pensation for mental suffering was permitted whenever a defendant com-
mitted any conventional tort incident to causing the mental anguish." Al-
though courts often stretched far to find a separate actionable tort so that
a plaintiff could recover damages for mental suffering, they were reluctant
to recognize the true basis of the recovery as compensation for the inten-
tional infliction of mental disturbance. 4
Separate Cause of Action. As cases in which there was no traditional ground
for relief began to accumulate, the courts in some jurisdictions began to
give way and allow recovery for mental suffering without the necessity
of showing a separate conventional tort. The first evidence of such a deci-
6 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Clark, 104 Okla. 24, 229 P. 779 (1924); Ohio-West Virginia
Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 97 W. Va. 61, 124 S.E. 587 (1924). See generally Prosser, Intentional
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939); Wade, Tort Liability
for Abusive and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L. REV. 63 (1950); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 46 (1964).
'United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Smith, 387 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Daniels v.
Conrad, 331 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). See generally Williams, Torts, 1954 Survey of
Texas Law, 9 Sw. L.J. 244 (1955).
8 This reasoning was firmly entrenched in the conviction that objective rather than subjective
criteria were more reliable evidence of the damage inflicted by a defendant's conduct. Payne, Re-
covery of Damages for Unpleasant Mental Stimuli, 2 ALA. L. REv. 218 (1950).
'Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
'
6 Boies v. Raynor, 89 Ariz. 257, 361 P.2d 1 (1961); Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Iowa 838, 169
N.W. 737 (1918).
'"Boies v. Raynor, 89 Ariz. 257, 361 P.2d 1 (1961) (false imprisonment); Dwire v. Stearns,
44 N.D. 199, 172 N.W. 69 (1919) (seduction); A. SEBGEWICK, MEASURE OF DAMAGES 700 (6th
ed. 1874).
" See cases cited note 10 supra. See generally Payne, Recovery of Damages for Unpleasant
Mental Stimuli, 2 ALA. L. REV. 218, 220 (1950).
"Spomer v. City of Grand Junction, 144 Colo. 207, 355 P.2d 960 (1960); Leach v. Leach,
33 S.W. 703 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
"
4 Interstate Life & Accident Co. v. Brewer, 56 Ga. App. 599, 193 S.E. 458 (1937).
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sion involved defendants who owed a special obligation to the public.
Courts held public carriers liable for insulting passengers even though the
mental disturbance was not attended by illness or other physical conse-
quences." Inkeepers,0 theaters, 7 and other public service companies re-
ceived the same treatment. 8
Another significant development in mental disturbance cases was in sit-
uations in which the defendant acted willfully, wantonly, or with ill will.
Practical joke cases presented situations in which the defendant went so far
beyond the bounds of human decency that the courts were compelled to
take action. 9 The defendant's conduct was so intolerable that decent so-
ciety had to allow plaintiff's recovery for mental distress.
The debtor-creditor cases in which creditors used outrageous high pres-
sure methods of collection also demonstrated the court's willingness to ex-
tend the right of recovery for mental suffering when the defendant acted
wantonly and with ill will.' Similarly, a defendant's insulting conduct ac-
companied by the knowledge that plaintiff was especially susceptible to in-
jury through mental interference sometimes caused the courts to allow
plaintiff damages for mental suffering. 1 Courts have considered mental ill-
ness, pregnancy, and youth circumstances making plaintiffs especially sus-
ceptible to injury through interference with peace of mind."
Cases in which defendant's actions were intended to affect a third per-
son but in which plaintiff suffered mental anguish as a result of the acts
created a problem commonly associated with the development of recovery
for mental suffering. Some courts decided that the plaintiff's mental dis-
tress was so foreseeable that the actions directed at the third party were
negligent toward the plaintiff." Others stressed the necessity for the plain-
tiff's physical presence in the vicinity of the defendant's act. 4 In deter-
1 Bleecker v. Colorado & S. Ry., 50 Colo. 140, 114 P. 481 (1911); Gillespie v. Brooklyn
Heights R.R., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Luther, 90 S.W. 44
(Tex. Civ. App. 1905), error ref.; Texas & Pac. R.R. v. Jones, 39 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897), error ref.
"Emmke v. DeSilva, 293 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1923); DeWolf v. Ford, 193 N.Y. 397, 86 N.E.
527 (1908).
'"Capital Theatre Co. v. Compton, 246 Ky. 130, 54 S.W.2d 620 (1932); Weber-Stair Co. v.
Fisher, 119 S.W. 195 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909).
'"Dunn v. Western Union Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907); Davis v. Tacoma
Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209 (1904) (restaurants and retail stores, unlike public
carriers, innkeepers, theaters, telegraph companies, etc., are regarded by the law as owing no special
obligation to the public other than the obligation owed by one individual to another); Larson v.
R.B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931); Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So. 2d
396 (Fla. 1958).
9 See, e.g., Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
"Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1293, 242 N.W. 25 (1932); Harned v. E-Z Fin.
Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
" Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920) (Defendants caused plaintiff to find a
supposed pot of gold which had been predicted by a fortuneteller. Defendants caused plaintiff to be
humiliated in front of a large section of her community, and plaintiff later died as a result of the
great mental anguish she suffered as result of the practical joke.).
' Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 Cal. App. 2d 124, 217 P.2d 113 (1950); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931).
s One case has allowed recovery on a "transferred intent" theory. Lambert v. Brewster, 97
W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924). Courts have failed to apply an "imputed intent" theory proba-
bly because of the history of the old trespass action, which did not include within its framework
emotional distress. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 53 (3d ed. 1964).
4 Ellsworth v. Massacar, 215 Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408 (1921); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS § 46 (1964).
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mining if the defendant owed a duty to foresee possible injury to plaintiff,
the question of whether the defendant knew or should have known of the
plaintiff's presence received consideration." It was also held that family
relationship insured that the mental distress experienced by the plaintiff
in witnessing the attack against a family member was authentic." Other
courts denied recovery for mental suffering caused by the willful acts of a
defendant against a third party."7
Recovery for mental suffering alone has generally not been allowed when
defendant's conduct was merely negligent and constituted an unintended
invasion of plaintiff's emotional tranquility." In refusing to afford relief,
the courts for the most part agreed that there was no duty to exercise care
to avoid causing a mental or emotional disturbance by a negligent act."9 In
some cases, however, recovery for the physical consequences of negligently
inflicted mental suffering has been permitted.' In such suits, the rationale
employed has been that used in allowing plaintiff to recover when defend-
ant acted willfully toward a third party but instead inflicted mental dis-
stress on plaintiff.
Texas Cases. Texas courts apply the common law rule, recognized by the
great weight of authority in American jurisdictions, which allows recovery
for mental suffering only when there is injury to plaintiff's property, some
other element of actual damages exists, or there is a resulting physical in-
jury.s' In S.H. Kress & Co. v. Brashier,a2 a department store customer pur-
chased a book which she was carrying under her arm. The store manager
mistakenly accused plaintiff of stealing the book and snatched it from her.
The court held that, despite the mistaken belief of the manager, a battery
had been committed and awarded plaintiff $ 500 to compensate "the humil-
iation and indignity" she suffered.' Kress demonstrates that courts do not
hesitate to value the injury caused to a plaintiff by the infliction of mental
suffering if such damages can be tacked on to other damages resulting from
a tort committed incident to the mental suffering. Moreover, Texas courts
also allow recovery for mental distress intentionally inflicted upon plaintiff
"SGoddard v. Watters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914).
asKnierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
11, at 54 (3d ed. 1964).
"Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich. 157, 192 N.W. 652 (1923); Ellsworth v. Massacar, 215
Mich. 511, 184 N.W. 408 (1921). The courts now are moving toward allowing recovery for men-
tal suffering resulting from intentional acts directed toward a third person when defendant is
shown to have been aware of plaintiff's presence. W. PROSSER, THE LAW oF TORTS § 11, at 54
(3d ed. 1964).
2SF. HARPER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 156 (1st ed. 1933).
29Kuhr Bros. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954); Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Francis, 206 Okla. 553, 245 P.2d 84 (1952).
'°Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Rasmussen v. Benson, 133
Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937). Thus, when defendant's negligent action caused mental anguish
for plaintiff, the courts looked for a close family relationship between plaintiff and the injured
and the plaintiff's presence in the near vicinity of the defendant's act. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel
& Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513 (1963); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A.
182 (1933).
31 Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 254 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson,
138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W.2d 246 (1942); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419
(Tex. 1894).
32 50 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
33 Id.
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absent an incident tort when physical injury results.' And in cases allow-
ing such recovery, mental suffering has ceased to be an element of damages
and has become a separate cause of action."
When there is no conventional tort or physical injury, however, Texas
courts have refused to accept the intentional infliction of mental suffering
as a separate tort. The leading case in point is Harned v. E-Z Finance Co.'
There plaintiff sought recovery for statutory penalties for collection of
usurious interest and for mental suffering caused by defendant's attempts
to collect such interest. In Harned the Supreme Court of Texas clearly
enunciated that there could be no recovery for even intentionally caused
mental suffering without proof of physical injury.
II. FISHER V. CARROUSEL MOTOR HOTEL, INC.
In Fisher the Supreme Court of Texas noted that the law has long rec-
ognized that actual physical contact with the body of the plaintiff is un-
necessary for a battery to have been committed. 7 Furthermore, upon exam-
ination of the circumstances, the court found that Fisher's plate was
snatched from him in a rude and insolent manner for the purpose of fur-
ther emphasizing the club's policy prohibiting service to Negroes." The
court was also impressed by the fact that Fisher had telephoned the de-
fendant hotel to accept the invitation for lunch, and that the reservation
had been received without question. Thus, the supreme court had little
difficulty finding both an intent to injure and a volitional activity violating
Fisher's rights."' Because of the battery committed by the mere snatching
of a plate, Fisher received compensatory damages for mental suffering and
exemplary damages based upon the manager's willful intent.
Since a battery was committed, the court was not required to consider
the issue of awarding damages for mental suffering absent a separate tort
or physical injury." The court, however, did cite Harned,' a case reiterat-
ing that Texas does not favor the "new tort" of intentional infliction of
mental suffering. Allowing recovery without a separate tort was consid-
ered in Harned to be a legislative function rather than a judicial one. In
"
4 Pioneer Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Adams, 426 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref.
n.r.e.; see Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 (Tex. 1894); Renfro Drug Co.
v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S.W.2d 246 (1942).
asHarned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 254 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
28254 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
" The finding had solid authority to support it in the Kress case. S.H. Kress & Co. v. Brashier,
50 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
"8 The manager was enforcing the dining club's rules, which stipulated that members of the
negro race were not to be served. For this reason and the fact that the employee was acting in
a managerial capacity, Carrousel Motor Hotel was found liable for the exemplary damages awarded
for the outrageous conduct offending Fisher. Cf. King v. McGuff, 149 Tex. 432, 234 S.W.2d 403
(1950).
"'See notes 5 and 6 supra.
4
"Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967).
41 Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 254 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
42 The court reasoned that the common law should rule unless changed by the legislature and
that the question of the "new tort" was embedded in serious policy considerations which should be
determined only by the legislature. However, courts have both changed common law where it be-
came obsolete and have ruled in decisions involving vital policy questions before with great success.
For example, the Texas Supreme Court has indicated that it will do away with the charitable
immunity doctrine when next presented with a case involving such immunity, which demonstrates
NOTES1968 ]
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Fisher, however, the court did not deny that, under the right set of facts,
it might recognize plaintiff's right to recover solely for the intentional in-
fliction of mental distress. Indeed, the court observed that "this cause of
action [intentional interference with peace of mind] has long been advo-
cated by respectable writers and legal scholars."'
The Texas rule of recovery for mental suffering, apparently continued
in Fisher, is somewhat incongruous. Fisher would have suffered the same
injury if the manager of the club had acted in the same malicious manner
but no battery had been committed. Also, had defendant's manager merely
asked plaintiff to replace his plate and leave the serving line, Fisher would
have been just as humiliated in the presence of his associates." Yet, in both
cases, the Texas Supreme Court would have had to deny recovery. The
court can act only when the defendant commits a technical tort, and then
exemplary damages may be awarded both to punish the defendant and to
deter outrageous conduct. "
III. CONCLUSION
While Fisher did not require the court to deal with the question of the
"new tort," intentional infliction of mental distress, the facts of the case
presented an opportunity to examine the necessity for the adoption of such
a cause of action when a propert set of facts so demands. Surely plaintiff's
recovery should not depend upon an incident tort when the injury to plain-
tiff and the malicious intent of the defendant are present." When pre-
sented by a set of facts requiring the adoption of the "new tort," the
Texas courts may yet abandon the requirement of an incident tort and
recompense plaintiff for his injury to prevent injustice.
One other aspect of Fisher merits attention. The judgment awarded
plaintiff represented both exemplary and compensatory damages. Although
the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions hold that exemplary damages serve
the purpose of deterring wrongful conduct and of punishing the wrong-
doer, England and three jurisdictions in the United States hold that the
nature of exemplary damages is compensatory. 7 If this latter view is cor-
rect,"5 Fisher may have received double compensation for mental suffer-
ing, because he was awarded both compensatory and exemplary damages.
the court's willingness to act when necessary. Watkins v. Southcrest Baptist Church, 385 S.W.2d
723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), aff'd, 399 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. 1966).
"'Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967).
"' Plaintiff was a mathematician for the Data Processing Division of Manned Space Craft Cen-
ter, an agency of the National Aeronautics and Space Agency, attending a conference regarding
telemetry, He called in his acceptance by telephone.
'Excessiveness of the award was never raised by defendant's counsel. Had this issue been raised,
the court might have had to re-examine the figure in light of reasonableness of amount. See Higgin-
botham v. O'Keeffe, 340 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), error ref. n.r.e.
" Had the luncheon been seated, would plaintiff have been denied recovery if insulted in a
similar fashion? Would not the damages be the same? Would the intent of the manager have been
different?
47 C. MCCORMC c, DAMAGES § 78, at 279 (1935); see Hasted v. Van Wagnen, 243 Mich. 350,
220 N.W. 762 (1928); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922). These cases
describe exemplary damages as "extra compensation for injured feelings or a sense of outrage" and
"'aggravated' allowance of compensatory damages permitted in cases of outrage."
48 Gonsoulin, Is an Award of Punitive Damages Covered Under an Automobile or Compre-
hensive Liability Policy?, 22 Sw. L.J. 433 (1968).
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Fisher demonstrates that exemplary damages may compound damages
awarded to a plaintiff for mental suffering if the plaintiff is also allowed
compensation for mental suffering.
Harriet E. Miers
Parental Immunity No Defense for the Negligent Driver
The automobile which Mrs. Hebel was driving collided with a truck-
trailer, and her daughter was injured. The minor child, through her father
as next friend, brought a negligence action against her mother seeking
compensation for the injuries. In the trial court, Mrs. Hebel moved for
summary judgment on the ground that a minor cannot sue his parent for
negligence. The trial court denied the motion, and an appeal was made to
the Supreme Court of Alaska. Held, affirmed: Because of the wide preva-
lence of automobile liability insurance, an unemancipated minor can bring
an action against his parent for personal injuries sustained as a result of
the parent's negligent driving. Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alas. 1967).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FAMILY IMMUNITIES IN TORT ACTIONS
Intra-family immunities developed as a result of legally recognized rela-
tionships, duties, and responsibilities. At English common law suits could
not be maintained between spouses since they were "one and the same per-
son."' However, there was no common law concept of legal unity of the
parent and child.' Suits by child against parent could be maintained in real
property actions,3 but there was no English authority allowing or denying
parental immunity from tort actions. The English view of interspousal im-
munity found its way to the United States.! Parental immunity, although
not a common law concept, developed in the United States as a result of the
courts' desire to protect the peace and harmony of the family unit.
Parental immunity from tort actions was first announced in Hewellette
v. Georges in 1891. There the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a minor
could not maintain an action for false imprisonment against her mother
who had maliciously confined her in an insane asylum. The court based this
decision on a public policy-the need to protect the peace and harmony
of the family-rather than on a theory of the family as a legal entity.
'Phillips v. Barnett, 1 Q.B.D. 436, 439 (1876).
2 For a discussion of the common law background, see Akers & Drummond, Tort Actions Be-
tween Members of the Family-Husband d Wife-Parent &. Child, 26 Mo. L. REv. 152, 153, 180-83
(1961); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1031-35,
1056-57 (1930).
'See Akers & Drummond, supra note 2, at 180.
4 Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877).
568 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
"The peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy, de-
signed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor
child a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent." Id. at 705, 9 So. at 887.
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